Logics for 'generally' are intended to express some vague notions, such as 'generally', 'several', 'many', 'most', etc., by means of the new generalized quantifier ∇ and to reason about assertions with 'generally' (important issues in qualitative reasoning). We introduce the idea of functional interpretation for 'generally' and show that representative functions (akin to Skolem functions) enable elimination of ∇ and reduce consequence to classical theories. Thus, one can use proof procedures and theorem provers for classical first-order logic to reason about assertions involving 'generally'.
Introduction
Logics for 'generally' are intended to handle some vague notions by means of (nonstandard) generalized quantifiers. Such generalized quantifiers have been used in connection with natural language [2] ; we call these generalized quantifiers "non-standard" to distinguish them from the more familiar Mostowski's quantifiers [11] . In this paper we provide a framework for reducing logics for 'generally' to first-order theories. As a result, one can use methods for classical first-order logic, such as proof procedures and theorem provers, to reason about 'generally'. Some logics for 'generally' were introduced for handling assertions with vague notions, such as 'generally', 'most', 'several' [9] . These logics are related to variants of default logic ( [12] , [1] ) and to belief revision [10] : they have various common applications ( [5] , [14] ). They are however quite different logical systems, both technically and in terms of intended interpretations [15] . Their expressive power is quite convenient (for instance, the expressive power of our quantifiers may be helpful in other possible applications: e. g. expressing some fuzzy concepts [19] ) and they have sound and complete deductive systems. This, however, still leaves open some questions, e. g. theorem proving. We will show that the functional interpretation allows one to reduce 'generally' to classical first-order theories. The development will concentrate on some logics for 'generally' [19] , but its the main lines can be adapted to other logics for 'generally'. This paper is structured as follows. The next section provides some motivations and ideas underlying logics for 'generally'. In section 3 we introduce the functional interpretation by means of representative functions, internalize them and then introduce extensionality. Coherence is introduced in section 4 to complete the reduction of 'generally' to first-order reasoning. In section 5, we show how our result provide a framework where reasoning with 'generally' reduces to first-order reasoning with extensional coherent functions and examine some illustrative applications of our method. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks about our approach and related work.
Reasoning with 'Generally'
We now examine some basic ideas about reasoning with 'generally'.
Basic Ideas: Families for 'Generally'
We first examine motivations and ideas underlying logics for 'generally'. Assertions and arguments involving some vague notions appear often, both in ordinary language and in some branches of science, where "modifiers", such as 'generally', 'rarely', 'most', 'several', 'typical', etc., occur. For instance, one often encounters assertions such as "Bodies generally expand when heated", "Birds generally fly" and "Metals rarely are liquid under ordinary conditions". 1 The assertions "Whoever likes sports watches SportsTV" and "Boys generally like sports" appear to lead to "Boys generally watch SportsTV".
Considering a universe of birds, we can express some assertions within classical first-order logic (e. g., "All birds fly" and "Some birds fly" by ∀vF (v) and ∃vF (v)). But, what about vague assertions like "Birds generally fly"? We wish to express such assertions and reason about them in a formal manner; so we need precise meanings for these vague notions. We actually have various such notions, but some of them may be expected to share properties, which can be used to characterize these vague notions by means of families. We now indicate how this can be done ( [16] , [18] ).
The intended meaning of "objects generally have property ϕ" can be given directly as "the set of objects having ϕ is important", or in terms of the set of exceptions as "the set of objects failing to have ϕ is negligible": for instance, one may understand "Eagles generally fly" as "The flying eagles form an important set" or "The non-flying eagles form a negligible set".
To describe the important and negligible subsets we may use common properties of their families K and N . For instance, the above argument about boys and sports seems correct because of the intuitive feeling that if a set L has several objects and L ⊆ S then set S will also have several objects: the family K of important sets (those having several objects) is closed under supersets. Families corresponding to other notions, such as (very) few, may be closed under union or intersection. For instance, if one accepts the assertions "Few naturals are below fifteen" and "Few naturals divide twelve", then one would probably accept the assertions "Few naturals 1 Such notions may also be useful in reporting experimental set-ups and results. Vague terms, such as 'likely', 'prone', etc., are used in everyday language. More elaborate expressions involving 'propensity' are often used as well: a physician may say that a patient's genetic background indicates a certain propensity, which makes him or her prone to some ailments. Such notions are also used in qualitative reasoning: a medical doctor prescribes a treatment to a patient considering this treatment as appropriate to a typical patient with such symptoms [19] .
are below fifteen and even" and "Few naturals are below fifteen or divide twelve", as well. For non-triviality, the family K of important subsets of a universe V should be proper (V ∈ K and ∅ ∈ K).
Some interesting classes of such families of important subsets are: up-closed (closed under supersets), lattices (closed under ∪ and ∩), filters (closed under supersets and ∩), and ultrafilters (maximal filters). For instance, the sets having more than, say, 70 % of the elements form an up-closed family (corresponding to a notion of 'several'), the finite unions of intervals of the reals and the cofinite open subsets of an infinite topological space form lattices (corresponding to notions of 'many'), the subsets including a given set and the cofinite subsets of an infinite universe form filters (corresponding to notions of 'most'), and the subsets having a given element form an ultrafilter. The families of negligible subsets are the dual ones: down-closed (closed under subsets), lattices (closed under ∪ and ∩), ideals (closed under subsets and ∪), and maximal ideals.
We will be considering logics capturing some vague notions by means of such families of subsets. Extensions of first-order logic with an operator ∇ and axioms to characterize the vague notion expressed by ∇ provide logics for reasoning about some vague notions [9] . So, one can express "Birds 'generally' fly" by ∇vF (v). (We are considering a universe of birds. If there are other animals, we can use sorts: the birds form a subsort of the universe ( [6] , [19] ).)
Logics for 'Generally'
Logics for 'generally' extend classical first-order logic ( [3] , [7] ) by a generalized quantifier ∇, whose intended interpretation is 'generally' ( [9] , [19] ). In this section we briefly review some of these logics: syntax, semantics and axiomatics.
Given a signature ρ, we let L(ρ) be the usual first-order language (with equality . =) of signature ρ. It is convenient to have a fixed, though arbitrary, ordering for the variables: in each list of variables, they appear according to this ordering.
We will use L ∇ (ρ) for the extension of L(ρ) by the new operator ∇. The formulas of language L ∇ (ρ) are built by the usual formation rules and a new variable-binding formation rule giving generalized formulas: for each variable v, if ϕ is a formula in L ∇ (ρ) then so is ∇vϕ. For instance, let L(x, y) stand for "x loves y". Then, ∀x∇yL(x, y) expresses "everybody loves people in general", ∃x∇yL(x, y) expresses "somebody loves people in general" and "people generally love each other" can be expressed by ∇x∇yL(x, y).
Other syntactic notions, such as substitution (ϕ[v/t] or ϕ(t)) and substitutable, can be easily adapted.
The semantic interpretation for 'generally' is provided by enriching first-order structures with families of subsets and extending the definition of satisfaction to ∇.
A modulated structure A K = A, K for signature ρ consists of a usual structure A for signature ρ together with a complex : a proper family K of subsets of the universe A of A.
We extend the usual definition of satisfaction of a formula in a structure under assignment a to its (free) variables as follows: for a formula ∇zϕ(u, z), we define
It will be convenient to employ the important concept of extension:
With this concept, we can see that a generalized formula is satisfied exactly when its extension belongs to the complex.
Satisfaction of a formula hinges only on the realizations assigned to its symbols. So, satisfaction for first-order formulas (without ∇) does not depend on the complex.
Other semantic notions, such as reduct and model (A K |= Γ), are as usual [3] , [7] . We will be mainly interested in some classes of modulated structures classified according to their complexes. A structure A K = A, K is up-closed, lattice, filter or ultrafilter when its complex K is closed under supersets, a lattice, a filter or an ultrafilter, respectively. This gives rise to notions of modulated consequence (denoted by |= k ) as expected, likewise for (modulated) validity. Filter consequence, for instance, is defined by Γ |= f τ iff A F |= τ for every filter model A F |= Γ. The behavior of ∇ is intermediate between those of the classical ∀ and ∃, whereas the behavior of iterated ∇'s contrasts with the commutativity of each classical quantifier: the formula ∇y∇xL(x, y) → ∇x∇yL(x, y) fails to be valid.
We now formulate deductive systems for our logics for 'generally' by adding schemes to a calculus for classical first-order logic. To set up our deductive systems for logics of 'generally' we take a sound and complete deductive calculus for classical first-order logic, with Modus Ponens (MP) as the sole inference rule (as in [7] ), and extend its set Φ of axiom schemes by adding a set Φ ∆ of new axiom schemes (coding properties of the complexes), to form an axiomatization for 'generally'. It is convenient to classify our axiom schemes into two kinds: basic and specific ones.
The three basic axiom schemes are formed as follows. Given generalized formulas ∇uψ and ∇vθ of language L ∇ (ρ), consider a new variable z and let 
Now, consider the set ∆ u consisting of all the universal generalizations of the following schemes (where ϕ, ψ and θ are formulas of L ∇ (ρ)):
These schemes code properties of complexes. Each subset ∆ ⊆ ∆ u of axioms for 'generally' gives a derivability relation ∆ , axiomatized by Φ ∆ := Φ ∪ ∆ b ∪ ∆. Derivations are first-order derivations from the schemes:
(Some schemes are derivable from the others. Independent axiomatizations can also be obtained [19] .) We will be mainly interested in some axiomatizations (noted k ):
Other usual deductive notions, such as (maximal) consistent sets, witnesses and conservative extension ( [3] , [7] ), can be easily adapted.
We can see that each formula is equivalent to one in variable normal form: where no variable occurs bound and free. (We have substitutivity of equivalents; for instance, a
We have sound and complete deductive systems for our logics for 'generally' (i. e. |= k = k ), which are proper conservative extensions of classical first-order logic ( [6] , [19] , [16] ). Soundness is clear and completeness can be established by adapting Henkin's familiar proof for the classical case. It is easy to see that we have conservative extensions of classical logic (Σ k τ iff Σ τ , for set Σ ∪ {τ } of sentences in L(ρ)). These extensions are proper, because some sentences, such as ∃u∇zu . = z, cannot be expressed without ∇ ( [19] , [16] ).
In the sequel we will introduce a procedure for reducing our modulated consequences to classical first-order theories. The basic idea is that the role of the basic and of the specific axioms will be played by their first-order counterparts (extensional and coherence axioms, respectively) on new function symbols. We will consider formulas in special forms, but (as will be seen) the development can be adapted to cover all formulas, at the price of using more new functions.
Representative Elements and Functions
We will first introduce the ideas of representative objects and functions.
"Birds generally fly" (∇vF (v)) means that the flying birds form important set of birds. With respect to flying, we may consider a representative bird as a bird b that represents birds generally: ∇vF (v) iff F (b). Thus, such a representative bird b provides a decisive local test for birds generally flying.
We now examine representative elements and functions in a modulated structure
. For instance, in a modulated structure A K , representing a world of animals where "Animals generally are voracious" and "Animals generally do not fly": A K |= ∇uV (u) and A K |= ∇u¬F (u), voracious animals are representative for general voracity and non-flying animals are representative with respect to generally not flying.
It is natural to extend this idea to generalized formulas with free variables. Given a generalized formula ∇zϕ(u, z) ∈ L ∇ (ρ) with list u of m free variables, a representative function for ∇zϕ(u, z) is an m-ary function f : A m −→ A, assigning to each m-tuple
. So, a representative element amounts to a nullary representative function.
Representative Axioms and Translation
We will now formulate the idea of representative functions by means of axioms.
We shall say that a generalized formula ∇zϕ of L ∇ (ρ) is in standard form iff it is in variable normal form and variable z is the next variable above all its other variables (free or bound). By a formula in standard form we mean one with all its generalized subformulas in standard form: every formula ϕ is equivalent to a formula ϕ in standard form. We extend this idea to sets of formulas. The representative scheme for a given set Ψ of formulas of language L ∇ (ρ) is the set ω[Ψ] consisting of the representative axioms for every standard generalized formula ∇zϕ in Ψ. In particular, we will use
for the representative scheme for L ∇ (ρ). These axioms enable the elimination of the new quantifier ∇ in favor of representative functions. To eliminate ∇, we transform each formula ϕ of
, where θ(u, z) is a standard-form equivalent of formula θ.
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This construction defines our
, which can be defined recursively as follows
, for ϕ of the form ∇zθ(u, z); ϕ F := Qzθ F , for ϕ of the form Qzθ, with Q being ∀ or ∃; ϕ F := ¬θ F , for ϕ of the form ¬θ; ϕ F := ψ F θ F , for ϕ of the form ψ θ, for a binary connective ;
We can now see that the representative axioms internalize the F-translation. 3 For instance, a standard-form equivalent of the sentence
4 The representative axioms for formulas ∇z¬S(z, y) and ∇z∀yL(z, y) of L ∇ (ρ) are, respectively, the sentences
, which is equivalent to ∀uR(u, f
).
Lemma 3.1
Given a set Ψ of formulas of L ∇ (ρ) closed under subformulas, the representative axiom
for the set Ψ of formulas yields the equivalence between each formula ψ ∈ Ψ and its F-translation ψ F in L(ρ[F ]), i. e. ω [Ψ] b ψ ↔ ψ F , for every formula ψ ∈ Ψ.
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Proof. By induction on the structure of formula ψ ∈ Ψ. For standard ∇zθ with list u of free variables in Ψ, we have θ F in L(ρ[F ]) so that (by inductive hypothesis)
We can also see that our F-translation gives a sound reduction of reasoning about 'generally' to classical first-order reasoning.
Corollary 3.2
Consider a set ∆ ⊆ ∆ u of axioms for 'generally'. For each set Γ ∪ τ of sentences of
Extensional Axioms
We will now formulate, by means of axioms, the idea that the representative functions can be made to have behavior depending only on the extensions. In the expanded language L ∇ (ρ[F ]) we can express the useful idea of extensionality of representative functions.
Consider generalized formulas ∇zψ and ∇zθ of L ∇ (ρ) in standard form with lists of free variables u and v, respectively. We select two new variables u and v, not occurring in them, and form an intermediate formula u (ψ, θ) v as ∀z(ψ ↔ θ) → u . = v. Now, considering the function symbols f As before, we extend this idea to sets of formulas. The extensional scheme for a given set ∆ of formulas of L ∇ (ρ) is the set ε[∆] consisting of the extensional axioms for all standard generalized formulas in ∆. Also, the extensional scheme for the language L ∇ (ρ) will be the set ε[
). Now, we show that every modulated structure can be expanded by extensional representative functions.
For instance, the z-extensional axiom for ¬S(z, y) and L(z, y) is the sentence Proof. For each subset X ⊆ A, select an element e X ∈ A, so that e X ∈ X when X ∈ K, and e X ∈ X when X ∈ K. For a standard generalized formula ∇zϕ of L ∇ (ρ) with list u of m free variables, we define f 
Proof. The preceding lemma yields expansion of models, whence ∆-conservativeness.
Coherence Axioms
We will now introduce the idea of coherence. We wish our transformation to preserve provability. For this purpose, we will need some (first-order) information connecting the new function symbols: their coherence. A motivation for coherence comes from examining the translation of the axiom schemes for generally into first-order. Considering the F-translation of these schemes, we can see that each instance of the basic schemes [∀∇] and [∇∃] becomes logically valid 10 , but not so for the specific schemes. Coherence will provide ways to handle these other schemes. (Extensionality will take care of the translated axioms in scheme
The (first-order) coherence axioms will be universal closures of certain formulas of L(ρ[F ]) built from transfers of translated formulas.
Consider generalized formulas ∇zα, ∇zβ and ∇zγ of L ∇ (ρ) with lists of free variables u, v and w, respectively, as well as functions f , g and h, with respective arities |u|, |v| and |w|, in F . The (binary) z-transfer formula
We will also use the (unary) z-transfer formula [α/f > z γ/h) as the special case
We can now describe the coherence axioms. Given a standard generalized formula ∇zϕ of L ∇ (ρ) with list u of free variables, formula ∇z¬ϕ in L ∇ (ρ) is also standard and has the same free variables; corresponding 9 The addition of the representative axioms ω[∇z∀yL(z, y)], ω[∇z¬S(z, y)] and ω[∇z(L(z, y) ∧ ¬S(z, y)] as well as the extensional axiom εz [¬S(z, y), L(z, y)] to the set Γ := {∇x∀yL(x, y), ∀y∇x¬S(x, y)} produces a filterconservative extension. 10 For a standard generalized formula ∇zϕ of L ∇ (ρ) with list u of free variables, the F-translation of the formulas ∀zϕ → ∇zϕ and ∇zϕ → ∃zϕ, respectively, are equivalent to the valid formulas ∀zϕ
13
Consider a specific axiom δ ∈ (∆ u − ∆ b ) for 'generally' in standard form; corresponding to it we have a coherence
14 Given a set ∆ ⊆ ∆ u of axioms for 'generally', we will use Ω[∆] := Ω[∆ − ∆ b ] for the coherence scheme corresponding to its specific axioms in standard form.
Functional Reduction for 'Generally'
We will now show how our results provide a framework permitting the reduction of reasoning with 'generally' to classical first-order reasoning.
Reduction of 'Generally' to First-Order
We first recall that the coherence scheme
We can see that the translated extensional scheme yields the translation of the basic scheme [↔ ν ∇] for 'generally'. 
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In general, our proof procedure will reduce modulated consequence to classical firstorder derivability with extensional coherent functions:
To show that this reduction procedure is sound and complete, we have established the following facts for a set Γ of sentences of L ∇ (ρ) and a set ∆ ⊆ ∆ u of axioms for 'generally'. 
The representative scheme
ω[ρ ∇ ] ⊆ L ∇ (ρ[F ]) internalizes the F-translation, i. e. ω[ρ ∇ ] b ϕ ↔ ϕ F , for each ϕ in L ∇ (ρ) (in 3.2).
Each extension by extensional representative axioms (in
Indeed, we can put together our results to see that we have a common (conservative) extension. We thus see that we have sound and complete procedures for reducing 'generally' to classical first-order reasoning.
Proof. The (⇐) implication follows from the inclusions
). The (⇒) implication follows from the preceding proposition:
Some Applications
As simple examples, we consider some transfer principles.
We can see that
because the translated conclusion (∇z∃uL(u, z)) F is a first-order consequence of the translated hypothesis (∃u∇zL(u, z)) F together with the up-coherence axiom for ∀zL(u, z) and ∃uL(u, z).
We can also see that {∇zψ, ∇z(ψ → θ)} f ∇zθ because (∇zθ) F is a first-order consequence of the translated hypotheses (∇zψ) F and (∇z(ψ → θ)) F together with the coherence axioms
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For an induction-like example, consider a universe of emeralds and imagine every emerald examined to be green. If we also assume that most emeralds are similar to those examined and that similarity generally transfers colors, then, in filter logic, we can infer that most emeralds are green. Here, Γ consists of the sentences κ:
In many practical cases (as in databases, for instance), we deal only with finitely many formulas. As our examples suggest, in such cases one needs only a finite number of new functions and axioms.
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Moreover, as the preceding examples indicate, our reduction procedure preserves the structure of the proofs, a remark that may be of interest for proof-theoretical considerations.
23 Given a derivation tree Π, in L ∇ (ρ), we obtain the translated tree Π F by means of replacements: we replace each occurrence of a basic axiom for invariance under syntax by the corresponding translated extensional axiom and each occurrence of a specific axiom in (∆ − ∆ b ) by the corresponding coherence axiom.
Corollary 5.4
Consider an axiomatization ∆ ⊆ ∆ u for 'generally'. Given a derivation tree Π showing that Γ ∆ τ , the translated tree Π F is a classical first-order logic derivation tree (in These ideas are also useful for investigating provability in logics for 'generally'. We will illustrate the application of these ideas to some cases of proofs involving simply generalized formulas: those having the form ∇zϕ, for ϕ without ∇. We know that ∇ is intermediate between ∀ and ∃. Our next result shows that, in the presence of purely first-order information, a single initial ∇ behave as either extreme: as ∀ (in the case of conclusion) or as ∃ (in the case of hypothesis).
Proposition 5.5
Consider a set Σ of sentences in L.
2. Consider formulas ψ and θ in L. 21 Indeed, using η for ∇z∃u[(E(u) ∧ G(u)) → G(z)], we can see that {σ, τ } f η and {κ, η} c ∇zG(z). 22 These new functions and axioms are related to the generalized subformulas of the formulas involved. Work in progress aims at a sharper delimitation.
23 Natural deduction for ultrafilter logic [13] can be regarded as using representative functions.
(a) Σ ∪ {∇zψ} c ∇zθ iff Σ ∀z(ψ → θ);
Proof. We reduce each case to first-order: (⇐) follows from the coherence axioms; for (⇒), we can select an element in the appropriate extension and use it to define equal constant representative functions; e. g., for Σ ∀z(ψ → θ) if Σ∪{∇zψ} c ∇zθ, we select an element in the nonempty z-extension of ψ ∧ ¬θ in some model M |= Σ (we consider sentences for simplicity: the argument carries over to the general case).
We can illustrate the ideas of the preceding result as follows. First, a consistent first-order theory with axioms expressing that "Mercury is not solid" and "Every metal, other than Mercury, is solid" cannot decide whether "Metals generally are solid". Now, consider purely first-order information Σ about workers in a plant. Assume that one observes that "workers generally are careless": ∇zC(z). One can then conclude that "workers generally are accident prone" (i. e. ∇zA(z)) iff Σ entails the universal assertion ∀z(C(z) → A(z)): "all careless workers are accident prone". Also, one can conclude the first-order assertion that "all workers are accident prone" (i. e. ∀zA(z)) from Σ ∪ {∇zC(z)} iff it follows from Σ together with the existential assertion ∃zC(z): "some worker is careless". The generalized assertion ∇zC(z) can be reduced to a first-order assertion iff Σ entails the (strong) first-order assertion ∃zC(z) → ∀zC(z).
Conclusion
Logics for 'generally' were introduced for handling assertions with vague notions, such as 'generally', 'most', 'several'. To make possible automated theorem proving in these logics, we have introduced the functional interpretation (with representative, extensional and coherent functions), which reduces the situation to classical first-order logic. As a result of this reduction, one can employ methods for classical first-order logic to reason about 'generally'. In particular, we can use any available classical proof procedure; so, there are many proof procedures and theorem provers at one's disposal [4] . (This reduction may fail to be applicable to some questions. For instance, since the translation is not surjective, it is not conclusive in the case of interpolation [17] .)
The approach is modular: the role of the basic axioms is played by the extensional axioms and that of the specific axioms is played by coherence axioms. Thus, the main lines of the development can be adapted to other logics for 'generally' with corresponding coherence axioms. (The case of ultrafilter logic can have a simpler treatment: with one representative function for each arity [21] .)
Our framework is not meant as a competitor to non-monotonic logics, although it does solve monotonically various problems (e. g. representative reasoning) addressed by non-monotonic approaches.
As our framework enables using any available classical proof procedure, we expect to have paved the way for theorem proving in logics for 'generally'. In addition, this approach helps to clarify the place of these extensions of classical first-order logic: despite first-sight impressions from their semantics, they can be regarded as classical theories of special functions.
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